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With the recovery of growth among some Southern states, the crisis of the Eurozone may 
appear to be coming to an end almost a decade after the start of the great world financial 
crisis. There are, nonetheless, two ways in which this crisis continues to be of central 
importance for political economists. First, even with the recovery, the Eurozone remains 
divided between a small group of creditor states (principally Germany and the Benelux 
states), and those countries (mostly Southern states) that still have weak financial positions 
(either public or private) and remain vulnerable in international financial markets. The 
Eurozone crisis also still matters for the lessons that are drawn from it. Accounts of why 
large current account and debt imbalances first emerged in the Eurozone,  and in some 
cases persist, inform how reforms- both in the Eurozone’s debtor states and of the 
Eurozone’s governance  itself – are understood and evaluated.  They also continue to frame 
how those reforms are framed for domestic audiences  
 
This article considers two competing types of explanation for the emergence of Eurozone 
imbalances and evaluates how persuasive they are. The first type, which has been advanced 
particularly forcefully by political scientist, in particular comparative political economy 
scholars, emphasizes differences in national institutions, in particular wage bargaining 
institutions. The second view, which has become dominant among economists (at least 
outside of Europe), emphasizes the uneven macro-economic impact that monetary union 
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had across states participating in the currency union. Those who have advanced the first 
view emphasize differences in the evolution of nominal labor costs and attribute these to 
differences in wage bargaining institutions and norms.  For the second, by contrast, the 
divergence of national unit labor costs itself was a consequence of the large, positive 
demand shock that monetary union entailed for those countries that saw a decline in 
interest rates as a result.  This demand shock was driven by very  
large capital inflows after 1999 which took on a self-reinforcing character in part because of 
the Eurozone’s governance model. Sorting out the relative importance of these two types of 
explanations remains a critical task, in particular for comparative political scientists who are 
accustomed to seek explanations for differences in economic outcomes in national 
institutions.  
 
In what follows I argue that those who emphasize wage dynamics are onto something 
important: their arguments fit the logic that has driven much government policy and social 
actor behavior in Germany.  Yet these accounts are not persuasive as an explanation for the 
debt imbalances that emerged in the Eurozone in the aftermath of monetary union. They 
overstate the importance of differences in national supply side institutions (those that 
determine the costs under which firms operate) and understate the role of cross-border 
dynamics in financial markets whose impact was principally macro-economic (that is, on the 
demand side).  Although some of these effects were predictable consequences of any 
monetary union, two features of the Eurozone, I argue, also contributed to these cross-
border dynamics. The first were rules that encouraged cross-border lending by banks to the 
Eurozone’s peripheral states and led this lending to intensify as current account imbalances 
rose. The second is the inordinate weight of the German economy in the currency area. This 
asymmetry between one, politically centralized economy and the rest of the Eurozone 
implies that domestically driven developments in Germany have strong, system-wide 




I. Eurozone Debt Imbalances: Looking for answers in national institutions 
 
The crisis of the Eurozone in 2010-2014 is commonly linked to the emergence of large 
current account imbalances in the currency area that are thought to have led deficit states 
to seek financing from the area’s surplus states. While the main debtor states –often 
referred to by the acronym GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) - have mostly 
closed their current account deficits since the crisis, the schism between creditor and 
debtor states remains a lasting feature of the currency area. This is reflected in Figure 1 
which shows the net closing position of the financial account at year’s end of the eight 
largest Euro states. With the exception of the rather stable position of Italy, there is little to 
suggest that the divide in financial positions that emerged in the run-up to 2008 is a thing of 
the past.  
 
 







The debtor states of the Eurozone are all countries whose trajectory of economic 
development lagged the Eurozone’s core economies in the early 20th century. It is thus 
tempting to conclude that the creditor/debtor divide has something to do with the 
domestic features that have been attributed to late “Southern-European” capitalism 
(Ferrera 1996; Rhodes 2005). Not surprisingly, comparative political economists have 
looked for national commonalities among the debtor states to explain the Eurozone divide. 
Early on, and largely due to the Greek public financial situation in 2009, economists argued 
that the GIIPS problem was one of fiscal profligacy. But that view was set aside when it 
became clear that among the debtor states were two states with the lowest levels of public 
debt in the currency zone (Ireland and Spain).  The common denominator of the GIIPS’s 
sovereign debt problems was failing private rather than public debt: a financial, rather than 
a fiscal crisis. Nonetheless, because the creditor states in 2010 insisted that the debtor 
states bail out their own banks with public funds before financial assistance was extended, 
non-performing private debt was largely incorporated into public debt.  
 
While the profligacy account has largely been set aside, comparative political economists 
have continued to look for a common denominator in the debtor states’ domestic political 
economies to account for their external financial weakness.  A significant number of authors 
have converged in pointing towards labor market institutions, and particularly wage 
bargaining systems  (Scharpf 2011, 2012; Hall2014, 2017; Hancke 2013; Johnston et al. 
2014; Johnston and Regan 2016; Höpner and Lutter 2018). Seeking to extend the insights of 
the varieties of capitalism and corporatism literatures to the euro crisis, they suggest that 
the underlying problem of the Eurozone lies in the excessive institutional heterogeneity that 
characterizes wage setting institutions across countries. The most important difference, 
they postulate, is the degree to which wage setting in export sectors constrains wage 
determination in either the public, or more broadly, sheltered sectors of an economy. The 
imbalances in current accounts that emerged following monetary union, these authors 
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suggest, were a consequence of the ability of export sector unions in the surplus states to 
constrain wage growth in the sheltered sectors of their economies, and the inability of 
unions in the debtor states to do so.  The financial inflows these countries experienced 
would thus have arisen principally to finance those current account deficits.  
 
The classic exposition of this argument is by Hancké (2013) who suggested that financial 
imbalances in the Eurozone reflected the inability of unions in the debtor states to 
subordinate wages growth in the public sector to the needs of manufacturing. Although 
employers and unions in these states did successfully impose wage restraint in the run-up 
to EMU, according to Hancke this proved but a temporary discipline that evaporated once 
monetary union was achieved. The result was wage-driven inflation (and consequently a 
loss of export sector competitiveness). Johnston et al. (2014) extend Hancke’s argument 
from the public sector to sheltered sectors more broadly. Excessive wage bargaining 
fragmentation in the debtor states, they suggest, meant that sheltered sector wages drove 
nominal wage growth and in turn price inflation. The link to the debtor states’ external debt 
is attributed to the loss of price competitiveness for exports. Höpner and Lutter (2018) 
more recently make a similar case, testing the relationship between unit labour costs and 
various measures of corporatism and emphasizing wage dynamics as the causal link. Others 
(see in particular Hall 2017) have sought to expand the argument by referring to broader 
“growth models” that also involve aspects of macro-economic management.  According to 
this view, the debtor states are those political economies in which growth was traditionally 
domestic demand-led  (as opposed to export led). The Euro-regime, with its emphasis on 
restrictive fiscal rules, is thought to be designed to support export-led growth, offering 
some states an advantage over others. However, in these analyses too, the perceived 
“fitness” for export-led growth – or lack there off – is typically traced back to differences in 
the characteristics of wage-setting institutions.  
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 The most careful effort to advance the wage-led argument to date comes from 
Johnston’s (2016) study of divergent economic performance among Eurozone states. 
Johnston draws a more nuanced picture of country experiences, addressing the role of 
demand-side phenomena, such as the housing booms and busts in Ireland and Spain in the 
process. In seeking a synthesis, however, she ultimately also links such macro-economic 
dynamics to differences in differences in wage setting arrangements. The rising current 
account deficits in Ireland and Spain from 1999 on, she argues, were due to the lack of a 
“cohesive, exposed sector collective bargaining actor that could facilitate wage moderation 
nationwide,” with public sector unions in Ireland also engaging in a deliberate strategy to 
raise wages in 2004.  Less wage moderation after the introduction of the Euro implied 
higher domestic demand which was accommodated through faster growth in private credit, 
and the . resulting real estate booms left the Irish and Spanish banking sectors highly 
exposed to the financial crisis. In Italy, Johnston argues, public sector unions dictated the 
pace of wage growth and price inflation simply as a result of excessive fragmentation in 
wage bargaining.  
 
Yet can current account developments and financial imbalances in the Eurozone really be 
traced back to wage dynamics? Were differences in nominal wage growth drivers, or the 
consequences, of those imbalances? And did developments in nominal unit labour costs 






II. Can the creditor/debtor State divide in the Eurozone be attributed to wage 
dynamics?  
Despite the intuitive appeal of explanations based on differences in national institutions 
that determine the supply-side of firms, there are reasons to doubt the wage-driven 
account of Eurozone financial imbalances. .  
First, we should acknowledge some significant problems with the way in which unit labor 
costs (ULC) – the most common measure of competitiveness – are often interpreted in the 
literature. ULC (real or nominal) are calculated from macroeconomic aggregates (total labor 
costs divided by output) either at national or sectoral levels. They are not based on direct 
observation of the wages paid by firms. Nominal ULC really measures the labor share in 
total output multiplied by a price effect (Felipe and Kumar 2014). This labor share is one 
component in the production costs of firms, but not the only one. The Unit Cost of Capital 
(the ratio of nominal profits to capital productivity – or the mark-up on the labor share) is 
another component, and Felipe and Kumar show that this measure grew substantially more 
over 1999-2007 than did real unit labor costs in all 12 of the original Eurozone economies. 
In addition, nominal ULC are affected by prices, which are influenced by demand as much as 
they are by supply-side conditions. And because change in ULC are calculated from 
economic aggregates, the measure is subject to numerous composition effects. One of 
these is the rate at which different sectors grow, which can have a major impact on the 
evolution of labor productivity but does not tell us what is happening at the firm or product 
level. Sectoral growth patterns are also affected by factors that impact domestic demand, 
including, as we will emphasize later, cross-border capital flows (Blanchard 2007; Lane and 
Benetrix 2011; Reis 2013; Benigno and Fornaro 2014; Benigno et al. 2015). 
Moreover, the view that wage dynamics were key drivers of Eurozone current account and 
financial imbalances clashes with much empirical evidence. First, there is the export 
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performance of Eurozone states. With the exception of Ireland, all the other debtor states 
(including Greece) saw significant growth in exports in the decade leading up to the world 
financial crisis. Even in  Italy and Portugal, which experienced slower growth, exports grew 
as a percentage of GDP. Spain, which saw one of the most spectacular growth booms, 
nonetheless also managed to increase its share of world merchandise exports (OECD 2015; 
Triffin 2013) even as the share of many emerging economies rose and Germany’s declined. 
Any assessment of countries’ export performance also needs to take account of changes in 
world markets (which tend to explain the bulk of change in a country’s export levels from 
year to year). Chen et al. (2012) show that German exports were buoyed by three trade 
shocks that worked heavily against the debtor state up to 2008: the integration of the 
Central and Eastern European Countries into Eurozone production chains, the asymmetric 
rise in Asian demand for German capital products, and oil prices. Gaulier and Vicard (2013) 
decompose the contributions to export of such changes and find that Eurozone debtor state 
export performance was as good (in the cases of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland) or 
better (Spain) than that of the Eurozone creditor states as a group and either matched or 
were better than Germany’s. Gros (2012) observes that, with the exception of Ireland, the 
percent export share of the other GIIPS in relation to the EU27 also did not decline, and in 
the Spanish case increased, despite the significant nominal appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis 
other world currencies Lastly, Gaulier and Vicard find that real unit labor costs (RULC) had 
very little impact on the debtor states’ export performance after monetary union. 
The notion that the GIIPS suffered because wage growth undermined exports thus does not 
hold. Yet what of the argument that wage dynamics explain the demand booms 
experienced by some of GIIPS, which in turn help explain rising imports? Here too the role 
of wages as driver seems questionable. First, there is much work attributing significant 
coordinating capacity to debtor state unions who continued to engage in competitive wage 
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bargaining following monetary union. Industrial relations scholars have found that wage 
moderation in these countries actually increased rather than decreased (Posen and Gould 
2006; Traxler 2009; Keune and Vandaele 2013, pp. 4-7; see also Rhodes 2014). Looking at 
manufacturing, Ramskogler (2012) shows that wage bargaining became more coordinated 
within the Eurozone over the period and that Germany became the wage pattern setter for 
other countries, an effect that was particularly strong in Southern Europe. This outcome is 
hardly surprising given that union leaders and employers in Southern Europe were keenly 
aware and concerned that monetary union might hurt export performance (Perez 2001).  
There is also no clear evidence that wage growth was dominated in any systematic way by 
sheltered sectors in the GIIPS. This argument has relied on sectoral unit labor costs or 
sectoral compensation figures (either per employee or hour worked). Both magnitudes are 
calculated from aggregates and can hide important composition effects. Aggregate macro-
data is much more comprehensively available than data based on wage surveys, explaining 
why cross-country statistical analyses often rely on such measures. Yet the harmonized 
wage survey data that is available from Eurostat does not fit the view that sheltered sectors 
dominated wage setting in the GIIPS.1 Figure 2 a and b plot the difference between nominal 
wage growth in industry (excluding construction) -- the sector with the heaviest export 
component -- and wage growth in the business sector as a whole (which includes sheltered 
activities) for the GIIPS (a) and for the largest creditor state economies in the Eurozone (b). 
We exclude the data for Greece as it contains two very large negative values for wage 
growth (i.e. wage reductions) that appear incongruous with other information.  
 
 
1 Eurostat Labour Cost Index (LCI) data, “wages and salaries”.  
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If wage growth in sheltered sectors outpaced that in manufacturing in the GIIPS, we would 
expect this difference to be positive in the period prior to the onset of the crisis in 2008. 
Yet, with the notable exception of Ireland in 2006, wages in the business sector as a whole 
grew less (negative values) or very close to the same as wages in manufacturing in almost 
all years in the four countries. This was true not just for Italy and Portugal (experiencing 
slower growth) but also for Ireland, Spain (booming economies) with the 2006 exception 
cited above. Conversely, the graph showing the difference in wage growth (total business 
sector minus industry excluding construction) among the creditor states suggests that it was 
only in Germany that this difference was consistently negative. Taken together, this data 
also seems to belie the notion that it was sheltered-sector wage leadership that set the 
debtor states apart.  
 
Figure 2 a and b 











b. Creditor States  
 
 
Source: Eurostat Labor Cost Index Data, Wages and Salaries. * Negative values mean wages 




There are also other indications that wage dynamics were not driving external imbalances in 
the Eurozone prior to 2008. We have pointed out why ULC growth can be a misleading 
indicator of wage growth. Nonetheless, we can learn from efforts to disaggregate the 
contribution to aggregate ULC growth attributable to wages as opposed to profits, 
productivity, and inflation. Several authors have carried out such exercises using slightly 
different data but yielding very similar findings (Gaulier and Vicard, 2013; Bourgeot 2013; 
Felipe and Kumar 2014). All conclude that, with the exception of Ireland, wages played a 
secondary role in producing the rise of aggregate ULC relative to Germany up to the crisis. 
Bourgeot shows that, except for Greece, all the other debtor states saw a substantial 
decline in the wage share in this period (as much as 7 per cent in Spain from 1999 to 2007) 
and that the bulk of the divergence in ULC came not from real labor costs but rather from 
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prices (i.e. inflation). This is illustrated most succinctly by the contrast in the evolution of 
nominal and real unit labor costs (Figures 3 a and b). 







Source: European Commission, AMECO Database, Labour Costs based on GDP (Income 
Approach), Total Economy 
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The decomposition exercises of both Gaulier and Vicard (2013) and Felipe and Kumar 
(2013) coincide with this finding. Using detailed sectoral data from the EU’s KLEMS 
database, and separating the contribution for each sector of within- and between sector 
wage and price increases, Gaulier and Vicard show prices (not wages) in non-tradable 
sectors were the principal contributors to aggregate ULC growth. Felipe and Kumar show 
the same using OECD data and highlight that labor compensation grew below labor 
productivity in all of the GIIPS. In addition, both analyses point to another finding: a marked 
upward turn in the trend of productivity in German manufacturing from 2002 on and the 
widening gap between productivity and labor costs (or the wage share) in that country. By 
contrast, labor productivity per hour worked in the GIIPS (as well as France) followed their 
preexisting trends.  
 The bulk of the divergence in NULC is thus explained by divergence in prices rather than 
wages between the debtor and creditor economies (Germany in particular) together with 
the inordinate rise in productivity observed in German manufacturing from 2002 on. This 
helps explain why aggregate ULC measures were closely correlated with current account 
deficits but barely so with exports.  
But could the difference in inflation rates itself be explained by wage dynamics? Gaulier and 
Vicard”s (2013) full disaggregation of within and between sectors wages and prices suggests 
not. The contribution of between-sector wages (as opposed to prices) was either negative 
(Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain) or quite small compared to prices (Ireland). The 
combination of good export performance and a rise in relative ULC driven by prices (not 
wages) in the non-tradable sector, the authors note, is a telltale “signature” that EMU 
exerted a demand (rather than supply-side) shock in the GIIPS. Their conclusion is 
buttressed by the findings of other studies, including Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis (2014), 
who find ULC made a minute contribution the GIIPS current account deficits, and Gabrisch 
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III. Debt Imbalances and Macro-economic dynamics in the Eurozone: the role of capital 
flows 
The evidence reviewed so far does not support the wage-driven view of the Eurozone’s 
imbalances. There is, however, a well-established, different explanation for why monetary 
union produced larger current account and debt imbalances. Economists have long 
recognized the dramatic rise in capital flows to the Eurozone’s periphery after EMU. These 
flows – from richer to poorer Eurozone states - took place via the Eurozone’s integrated 
banking system primarily in the form of interbank lending and purchases of bank-issued 
portfolio debt (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2006; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011). When credit 
markets seized up during the 2008 financial crisis, interbank flows not only stopped but 
dramatically reversed, so that Eurozone debtor states experienced a “sudden stop” 
resembling those previously observed after periods of rapid capital inflows to emerging 
market economies (Pisani-Ferry and Merler 2012; de Grauwe 2013; Schelkle 2017). Any 
adequate evaluation of the role of national supply-side factors in the Eurozone’s debt 
imbalances requires we take into account these cross-country financial market dynamics 
and their macro-economic effects.  
 
The idea that the Eurozone’s debt imbalances were driven by activity captured in the capital 
rather than current account has been advanced by some political economists (Jones 2014; 
Fuller 2017). Current account shortfalls must be covered by the capital account from an 
accounting point of view. But there is often a presumption in the political economy 
literature that the former drives the latter. In reality, capital flows can be motivated quite 
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independently of activity captured in the current account. And within a monetary union 
where the receiving country does not experience currency appreciation as a result of capital 
inflows, those inflows tend to be expansionary (Blanchard et al. 2015). They can produce 
current account deficits by encouraging local banks to issue more credit, boosting domestic 
demand, imports and prices. Thus it is particularly important to understand what motivated 
cross-border banking flows into the Eurozone debtor prior to the crisis.  
 
Numerous analyses have highlighted the role of core Eurozone country banks in lending to 
the currency area’s periphery (both its private and public sectors) and in withdrawing funds 
from the area when the crisis hit (Hall, 2012; Thompson 2015; Blyth 2013 ; Glatzer, Goyer 
and Miguel 2014; Shin 2012; Bruno and Shin 2012; Mabbet and Schelke 2014; Hobza and 
Zeugner 2014). What is less often discussed are the ways in which this pattern of interbank 
flows was linked to monetary union itself and fostered by the Eurozone’s rules.  
 
III.a. Monetary Union and the end of Feldstein-Horioka  
The impact of monetary union on intra-Eurozone bank credit flows was recognized well 
before the world financial crisis. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) observed that the 
redirection of capital flows from richer to poorer Eurozone states was so large that it had 
undone the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: the generally observed correlation between 
countries’ national saving and investment rates. Though this formed part of a broader 
redirection of flows towards poorer countries observed across the OECD countries from the 
1990s on (a change often ascribed to the “search for yield” by institutional investors in a 
low interest rate environment), the intensity of the shift in the Eurozone was greater. One 
reason was that the EU already had well developed cross-border interbank markets that 
were boosted by additional financial market directives in 2000. Some authors suggest that it 
was this additional financial market deregulation that drove the boom in interbank flows 
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(e.g. Stockheimer et al. 2016). But others have shown that monetary union itself had a 
“financial integration” effect reflected in a sharp rise in cross-border lending, This effect was 
distinct from the broader effects of EU-level and global financial deregulation and involved 
a sharp intensification of flows between cross-border pairs of Eurozone commercial banks 
(Spiegel 2009a; see also Lane 2006 a,b; Hale and Siegel 2009; Spiegel 2009b).  
 
The financial integration effect of EMU was fully expected and perceived as one of its main 
benefits. When Portugal and Greece rapidly developed significant current account deficits 
upon joining the Euro, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002: 148) suggested this was exactly what 
“can and should happen when countries become more closely linked in goods and financial 
markets. To the extent that they are the countries with higher expected rates of return, 
poor countries should see an increase in investment… [as well as]… a decrease in saving.” 
Thus, “poorer countries should run larger current account deficits, and, symmetrically, 
richer countries should run larger current account surpluses.”  
 
While goods and financial market integration facilitated the expected divergence in savings 
rates, the elimination of currency risk strongly amplified the pattern. Monetary union, 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002: 172-173) noted, opened Greece and Portugal to “a much 
more liquid [interbank] market than the small domestic market in which [their banks] 
previously had to operate if they did not want to face currency risk”. This, they concluded, 
justified the position of “benign neglect” taken by the ECB and European Commission 
towards the two countries’ rising current external deficits.  
 
Yet by 2006, Blanchard (2006) and others were noting the pro-cyclical character of capital 
flows in the Eurozone, and the absence of policy instruments to prevent booms and busts in 
countries experiencing inflows. Portugal and Italy experienced short booms and busts in the 
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first half of the 2000s. The ability of both governments to address the busts was constrained 
by their efforts (even if not always successful) to meet the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
criteria By contrast, countries that had joined the union with low public debt levels and 
were not constrained by the SGP, were primed for credit-led demand booms. In the period 
up to 2008, both Ireland and Spain ran significant government budget surpluses alongside 
higher than average inflation. ECB policy, however, could not be calibrated to their 
conditions as the core economies of the Eurozone were still emerging from their recessions 
in the mid-2000s (see Darvas and Merler 2013). As the Spanish and Irish economies grew, 
their public debt also kept falling, shifting more and more lending to the private sector. The 
Eurozone’s design placed no constraints on this growth of private debt, and the prevailing 
interpretation was that fast growth was a virtuous consequence of low public debt levels. In 
the prevailing climate, had these governments tightened their fiscal stances further to slow 
down their economies, this would have raised their budget surpluses further and likely 
exacerbated the boom in their credit markets.  
  
III.b. The role of interbank markets 
Whether booming (as in Ireland, Spain and Greece) or experiencing an early boom followed 
by low growth (Italy and Portugal), all of the Eurozone’s peripheral economies saw intense 
capital inflows, mostly in the form of interbank lending and purchases of securitized debt 
instruments by foreign banks (see Table 1). In Greece and Italy foreign inflows were 
dominated by interbank purchases of public debt, whereas in Spain and Ireland they 
interbank inflows were dominated by indirect lending to the private sector, with foreign 
banks purchasing private debt securities issued by local banks (Lane 2006; 2013).2 Several 
studies show that the direct origin of these flows was from banks headquartered in core 
 
2 For sectoral debt flows, see Lane (2013), Table 3.  
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Eurozone states, along with the UK (Noeth and Sengupta 2012; Gourinchas 2012; Shin 2012; 
Hobza and Zeugner 2014). Figure 4 illustrates the intense rise of cross-border bank claims 
within the Eurozone in contrast to other areas of the world. French and German banks 
played an important role in purchasing Eurozone peripheral debt, though Belgian (in 
particular Dexia) and Dutch banks (Ing) also became major lenders. British and Swiss banks 
also played an important role in Ireland and Greece. But the direct origin of the most 
interbank flows to the GIIPS was the Eurozone’s core (Noeth and Sengupta 2012).  
 
Figure 4 
Cross-border Bank Assets as per cent GDP (based on BIS Locational Banking Statistics) 
 
 
Source: Lane 2103, p. 31 
 
Numerous analyses show that interbank flows dominated trade-related flows - as 
emphasized by the “competitiveness gap” thesis - in producing the current account deficits 
of the GIIPS (In’t Veld et al. (2013); Reis (2013); Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013); 
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Comunale and Hessel 2014; Hobza and Zeugner 2014). Looking at bilateral trade and 
financial flows, Hobza and Zeugner (2014) show that the correlation between trade-flows 
and financial flows in the Eurozone unraveled after EMU whereas current account balances 
became closely linked to financial ties between countries.  
 
But why did EMU set off intense interbank flows to the Eurozone periphery?  Three factors 
are emphasized in the literature, all consequences of currency union: 1) the required 
convergence of interest rates across the area, which spurred growth prospects in the 
periphery (Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis 2014); 2) the disappearance of currency-risk 
associated with lending to the Eurozone’s poorer states (Kalemli Ozcan et al. 2010); and 3) 
the asymmetric financial liberalization that monetary union which reduced transaction costs 
more for Euro area banks than for outside banks (Courdacier and Martin 2009).  
 
These factors created a strong set of incentives for banks in the Eurozone’s core to engage 
in a form of carry-trade between international financial markets and the economies of the 
Eurozone periphery. Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) calculate that EMU led to reduction of 
transaction costs for all banks in the world of between 14 to 17 per cent, but that it also 
lowered those costs for Eurozone banks by an additional 17 per cent for bonds and 10 per 
cent for stocks. Eurozone banks, as a consequence, became heavily engaged in the business 
of intermediating funds from the rest of the world to the Eurozone’s periphery (Hobza and 
Zeugner 2014; Ersal-Kiziler and Nguyen 2016). Lane (2013, p. 40) shows that capital inflows 
(in particular portfolio debt and lending) as well as the stock of foreign liabilities (all 
measured as a per cent of GDP) increased vastly, not just for the Eurozone’s periphery but 
also to several of its core economies in the run-up to 2008. And Hale and Obstfeld (2016) 
illustrate the central role of core Eurozone banks in channeling loans to the GIIPS by 
showing that core Eurozone banks increasing their borrowing in international financial 
markets to expand their purchases of Eurozone periphery debt with an almost one-to-one 
correspondence (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5  
Syndicated borrowing from International Financial Centers (FIN) and Lending to the GIIPS by 
Eurozone core country banks 
 
 
Source: Hale and Obstfeld (2016)  
 
There are strong indications that this sharp rise in crossborder interbank flow was a cause – 
and not just a consequence - of Eurozone current account imbalances.  Lane and McQuade 
(2013), for instance, find that credit booms across the Eurozone were directly correlated to 
the size of interbank inflows. And Comunale and Hessel (2014) find that credit growth was 
even more important than prices in determining real effective exchange rates. Chen et al. 
(2012) also identify flows from core Eurozone banks as one of the two most important 
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determinants of the GIIPS’ current account deficits with the rest of the world (the other 
being the nominal appreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis other currencies up to 2008).  
 
Most important capital inflows implied a large, positive, domestic demand shock in the 
GIIPS, boosting imports in relation to exports and feeding growth in non-tradables (Calvo et 
al. 1996; Reis 2013). This, by itself, would explain why the debtor states had higher inflation 
than the core economies. At the same time, the combination of an appreciating currency 
and capital inflows lowered productivity growth (as sheltered sectors tend to have lower 
labour productivity levels) in turn implying the rise in ULC (Benigno and Fornaro 2014; 
Benigno et al. 2015)). Thus, many of the results so often attributed to the functioning of 
labor markets can in fact be attributed to the consequences that EMU had in credit flows 
and the macro-economic effects these had in the Eurozone’s debtor states.  
 
III.c A governance model that fed booms and busts  
This brings us to the question of how the Eurozone’s institutional set-up contributed to 
these financial flow dynamics. First, because EMU required the convergence of nominal 
interest rates and eliminated perceived currency risk, it incentivized investors to shift their 
investments to the periphery. In addition to the carry-trade incentives for banks, the 
convergence of interest rates changed the cost of financing in the core states relative to the 
periphery (it virtually equalized it), and hence the ratio in the expected rate of return on 
investment in the two areas.  
 
The Eurozone’s macro-institutional architecture and rules-based governance (Schmidt 2015) 
also intensified the dynamic in interbank flows. With monetary policy centralized in the 
hands of the ECB, and in the absence of cross territorial fiscal flows to smooth the uneven 
effects of a single monetary policy, the euro’s governance model – restricting public but not 
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private debt – encouraged pro-cyclical interbank flows. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the 
SGP did restrain fiscal expansion for countries with high public debt levels (Italy and 
Portugal) even if they did not always meet the deficit rules. But their efforts to do so also 
reassured portfolio investors that GIIPS debt was as a safe asset.  
Lane and Pels (2012) show that capital flows to the GIIPS up to 2008 were linked to the 
growth expectations of foreign banks, which relied heavily on the forecasts of the OECD and 
the IMF. In 2002-2007, these growth forecasts were strongly influenced by the assurance 
provided by the Euro’s rules, so much so that forecast growth became positively correlated 
with the size of a country’s current account deficit. Lane and Pels show that forecast growth 
was also correlated positively with investment in non-residential construction and 
negatively with a country’s savings rate. OECD and IMF growth forecasts thus rewarded 
those countries whose current account deficits were widening and encouraged further 
capital flows to them.  
 
Euro governance thus reinforced the pattern of financial flows to the Eurozone’s periphery, 
amplifying asset price booms in the debtor states. Once the crisis occurred, the Euro’s 
design amplified the crisis in the debtor states working in the opposite direction. The long 
delay in the ECB’s actions as a lender of last resort – together with Europe’s ad hoc 
response to the Irish and Portuguese crises – riled international bond markets. Starting in 
May 2010, (when the terms of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) facility were 
announced and debt mutualization proposals were rejected (Matthijs and McNamara 
2015), yield spreads on Italian and Spanish sovereign debt – two states deemed too large to 
bail-out under the terms of the agreement – began to rise well beyond levels justified by 
fundamentals, suggesting a pure “contagion” effect (Constancio 2011) that would only be 
stemmed with Draghi’s July 2012 announcement saying the ECB stood ready to carry out 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), purchasing sovereign bonds in secondary markets. 
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The absence of banking union – and the Eurogroup’s initial refusal to allow direct EFSF 
recapitalization of banks -  in turn forced debtor states to transfer the full cost of bank 
rescues to public debt. The result was a negative feedback loop in the creditworthiness 
attached to banks and sovereigns by international rating agencies (Acharya et al. 2011; Alter 
and Schüler 2012) and a fragmentation of Europe’s credit and sovereign debt markets. 
Cross-border financial flows, which had played such an important role in producing credit 
booms in the GIIPS, now became an equally pro-cyclical force on the downside (Enoch et al. 
2013).  
 One question these effects of the Eurozone’s design raise is whether the rules could 
have been fine-tuned in such a way as to avoid these boomerang effects in capital markets, 
for instance by refusing to accept government bonds from any country not compliant with 
its fiscal rules as collateral.  Yet it is questionable whether such fine-tuning can ever be 
sufficient to compensate for the absence of a more complete macro-economic framework 
in which fiscal policy compensates for the uneven effects of a single monetary policy.   The 
countries not compliant with the ECB’s rules up to 2008 were not particularly those 
experiencing large capital inflows.  Neither Ireland nor Spain breached the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact prior to 2008, whereas all of the major creditor states in the 
Eurozone (including Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria) did so early on 
and repeatedly.  A stricter imposition of the fiscal rules would thus have been unlikely to 
reverse the capital market dynamic and might simply have implied an inappropriate 
demand policy for those countries that were experiencing slower growth.  It would also, of 
course, have been politically impossible to impose such a measure in the Council when all 
creditor states would have been the target. Once the crisis hit, on the other hand, such a 
draconian collateral rule would simply have further aggravated the capital flight from the 
debtor states.  Both points go to show that fiscal rules simply cannot compensate for the 
inexistence of a fiscal union, which would compensate the uneven effects of a single 
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monetary policy by increasing revenue coming from faster growing states and increasing 
transfers to those that are growing more slowly at any one point in time.  
 
 III.d An asymmetric currency union  
The Eurozone’s design thus reinforced the uneven impact of monetary policy, amplified its 
fiscal costs, and prolonged the depth and duration of the crisis in the debtor states, all via 
the effects it had on capital flows. However, the Eurozone is a politically and fiscally 
decentralized currency union in which one politically and fiscally centralized member has a 
highly disproportionate weight. With over 25 per cent of Eurozone GDP, developments in 
Germany intensified the financial market dynamics described above.  
 
Germany’s growing dependence on exports as an engine of employment over the last two 
decades also contributed to Eurozone imbalances. As Schelkle (2011) argues, Germany’s 
export-oriented policies were what would be expected from a smaller, emerging market 
economy, and Hassel (2017) has shown that this export dependency is triply reinforced by 
the country’s industrial relations system, its social insurance based financing of the welfare 
state, and fiscal federalism. As Baccaro and Benassi (2017) argue, the German economy’s 
dependence on exports for growth increased strongly between 1999 and 2007, and was 
largely driven by policy choices that repressed domestic demand, putting further downward 
pressure on prices and hence contributing to the decline in Germany’s Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER). 
 
To be sure, monetary union itself contributed to these outcomes. A shift in the balance of 
exports to imports in Germany was predictable, as the Euro afforded German firms a 
relatively undervalued currency and subjected the GIIPs to a relative overvaluation. The fact 
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that the countries of the periphery on the whole were able to maintain a relatively good 
export performance despite this overvaluation is, if anything, the more remarkable fact. 
 
At least four types of action by governments and social actors in Germany in 2000-2008  
helped dampen domestic demand and increased the imbalance between savings and 
investment in that country: 1) far reaching social reforms instituted from 2000 on, in 
particular the Hartz reforms of 2003-2005; 2) a 2000 tax reform that favored the retention 
of earnings by firms over the distribution of profits to households; 3) a continuing decline in 
public capital investment from 1995 on; and 4) the decision by German employers and labor 
unions to maintain below productivity wage growth for certain jobs. By increasing economic 
insecurity, the Hartz reforms encouraged households to increase their precautionary. They 
also increased the income share of capital rich households (which have higher savings rates, 
raising overall household savings).  On the other hand, the 2000 tax reform increased 
corporate savings and reduced dividend pay-outs, which in turn lowered demand (IMF 
2014: pp. 7-10). And wage agreements - together with the unions turn to concession 
bargaining at the plant level - allowed a significant fall in real wages at the lower end of the 
wage distribution, in particular in the service sector (Dustmann et al. 2014; Hassel 2011; 
Bibow 2012; Bofinger 2016; Krebs and Sheffel 2013).  
 
Many authors regard this combination of measures as part of a strategy to reign in wage 
growth and domestic demand and thereby boost exports at the expense of imports 
(Schelkle 2011; Hassel 2011).  Some even go so far as to refer to it as a form of “wage 
dumping” (Flassbeck 2012; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013; Stockhammer 2011). 
Nonetheless, there are also authors who argue that Germany’s export-boom was not based 
on labor costs or even price competitiveness but rather on improvements in firm 
productivity (Strom and Naastepad 2014). Kollmann et al. (2015) and Bofinger (2016) 
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suggest that wage moderation did have an impact on the German current account, but that 
this was due principally to its effect on domestic demand and repressed domestic prices 
(which affected the real exchange rate) rather than an effect of lower labor costs on 
exports.  
 
What matters from the standpoint of the Eurozone, however, is that Germany’s 
disproportionate weight means that measures affecting domestic demand in that country 
have systemic consequences.  It is certainly indisputable that German policy broke with an 
implicit premise of monetary union: that wage growth would be kept in line with the ECB’s 
inflation targets (see Dyson 2003; Bofinger 2016)). The behavior of German governments, 
firms, and unions all helped undermine this principle, exacerbating the asymmetric 
demand-side effects that EMU had on the Euro’s core vis à vis its periphery.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
I have taken issue with explanations of Eurozone debt imbalances that center on the 
heterogeneity in wage-setting institutions. There is little evidence that wage dynamics 
played a central role in the debtor states’ predicament. The rise in the GIIPS unit labor costs 
relative to Germany is better explained by the impact of monetary union on financial flows 
and demand. The shift of flows to the GIIPS in the run up to 2008 was set off by the 
incentives that EMU created for banks in the Eurozone’s core, which could exploit their 
position as intermediaries in channeling international lending to the debtor states. 
Interbank flows aggravated - rather than compensated for - the uneven effects of a single 
monetary policy for all, boosting demand in countries that experienced higher inflation. 
Although partly an inevitable consequence of monetary union - initially welcomed by 
economic analysts - was also reinforced by the rules and governance structure of the 
Eurozone.  
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Because those rules offered no corrective, financial flows acquired a self-reinforcing 
character, both in the run-up to the world financial crisis and, in the opposite direction, 
after the crisis broke. The rules placed limits on public debt but not on private debt. The ECB 
could not counteract the financial incentives this created. In fact, the tenor of monetary 
policy – in particular in 2004-2007 and in 2011 (Darvas and Merler 2013) – tended to be out 
of sync with price developments in the GIIPS. The long delay (until 2015) in ECB quantitative 
easing, exacerbated the cost of the crisis in those states. Social, labor market, and tax 
reforms in Germany contributed to the asymmetric macro-economic shock bolstered by 
monetary union.  
As noted, the long tide of flows to the GIIPS had important effects on the “structure” of 
these economies in the run-up to 2008, such as the excessive growth of the construction 
sector, but this does not mean that the internal devaluation strategy advanced by creditor 
states and European officials offers a solution. The “small economy” model pursued by 
Germany cannot be emulated by all without compromising demand in the currency zone at 
large. Where employment growth has re-started following measures to deregulate labour 
markets, it has been at the cost of a significant deterioration of employment conditions. 
Many of the costs of the prolonged economic contraction to which internal devaluation has 
contributed in the South - e.g., long lasting unemployment periods in the lives of many 
individuals and the demographic shock to national pension systems - will only manifest 
themselves fully in the future, even when the crisis has putatively come to an end.  
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